I just read a report (here), published in January by US Army Colonel Daniel Davis, a veteran of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is the 84 page unclassified version of the report, the classified version having been delivered to the US Army Command and the US Congress. It provides quite a different view on how the war is going, compared to the view of the mainstream media. It is important to note that this report was released before the killing of sixteen civilians by as US soldier in March, so it is fair to say the situation there has since become worse.
One of the large points of the report is to point out that US troop surge, counterinsurgency and training of the Afghan National Army has failed to reduce violence in the country, and has acutally seen it increase. It is summed up in this statement in the report:
Another interesting portion of the report is about media delivery by mainstream organizations, highlighted in pages 26 - 29. Davis' viewpoint is that media corporations will deliver stories in a pro-US, biased light in order to please the Pentagon, in order to secure contact with high level command figures. He also provides examples of reporters and correspondents that were shut out by media on government request for questioning the progress of the war.
The scariest part is his assesment of what the ISAF would need to win the war outright:
"In order to pacify the contested parts of Afghanistan militarily it is my assessment it would take upwards of 300,000 combat troops, stationed in sufficient density in critical areas, in order to eradicate the Taliban element of the population and keep a close enough eye on the population to prevent others from becoming Taliban fighters."
He also goes on to say that this is also a mistake, since the mere presence of a force that large would increase the feeling of foreign occupation and thus align the populace away from the ISAF. It's obvious to say that a troop deployment of this size could never take place; there simply is not the international or US popular support needed to make it happen.
He also explores events of the Iraq War, notably the Anbar Awakening in 2007, when the Sunni population turned against Al-Qaeda. Davis, as also noted in Mark Urban's book: Task Force Black, does not attribute this to US involvement, instead (backed by accounts of insurgent fighters) ascertains it was simply a result of the Sunni population being fed up with the brutality inflicted on it by Al-Qaeda, therefore turning against the Jihadists, to the delight of US forces in Iraq. Events like this have not happened yet, and I am also of the opinion that until they do, the ISAF cannot win the war in Afghanistan. More on the topic of the local populace is noted on page 73.
In Davis' conclusion is a great quote, one which gives me hope for future change:
"Honestly, after all I’ve seen over the past decade and a half, I felt a moral obligation to do so. I believe that with knowledge comes responsibility; I knew too much to remain silent."
It is my opinion that the war in Afghanistan will be a defeat. While being supported by Pakistan, the Taliban will enjoy a safe haven in the border regions, where they will be able to conduct operations from and replenish their losses, and will simply wait out the ISAF until domestic support for the war will no longer tolerate it's soliders being killed and wounded, and foreign troops will then be withdrawn. And in the same fashion as the post-Soviet withdrawl in 1989, a brutal civil war will follow in Afghanistan, as the Taliban attempts to regain control of the country. It is when this process will start, however. I do not see the American government adhering to the 2014 withdrawl date, especially if the next president is Republican.
One of the large points of the report is to point out that US troop surge, counterinsurgency and training of the Afghan National Army has failed to reduce violence in the country, and has acutally seen it increase. It is summed up in this statement in the report:
"If I have tens of thousands of additional ISAF boots, and I kill hundreds of INS leaders, thousands of his fighters, capture huge numbers of caches, take away his sanctuaries, and deny him freedom of movement, how could he then significantly increase his level of attacks as the Taliban did in the first half of 2011?"
The scariest part is his assesment of what the ISAF would need to win the war outright:
"In order to pacify the contested parts of Afghanistan militarily it is my assessment it would take upwards of 300,000 combat troops, stationed in sufficient density in critical areas, in order to eradicate the Taliban element of the population and keep a close enough eye on the population to prevent others from becoming Taliban fighters."
He also goes on to say that this is also a mistake, since the mere presence of a force that large would increase the feeling of foreign occupation and thus align the populace away from the ISAF. It's obvious to say that a troop deployment of this size could never take place; there simply is not the international or US popular support needed to make it happen.
He also explores events of the Iraq War, notably the Anbar Awakening in 2007, when the Sunni population turned against Al-Qaeda. Davis, as also noted in Mark Urban's book: Task Force Black, does not attribute this to US involvement, instead (backed by accounts of insurgent fighters) ascertains it was simply a result of the Sunni population being fed up with the brutality inflicted on it by Al-Qaeda, therefore turning against the Jihadists, to the delight of US forces in Iraq. Events like this have not happened yet, and I am also of the opinion that until they do, the ISAF cannot win the war in Afghanistan. More on the topic of the local populace is noted on page 73.
In Davis' conclusion is a great quote, one which gives me hope for future change:
"Honestly, after all I’ve seen over the past decade and a half, I felt a moral obligation to do so. I believe that with knowledge comes responsibility; I knew too much to remain silent."
It is my opinion that the war in Afghanistan will be a defeat. While being supported by Pakistan, the Taliban will enjoy a safe haven in the border regions, where they will be able to conduct operations from and replenish their losses, and will simply wait out the ISAF until domestic support for the war will no longer tolerate it's soliders being killed and wounded, and foreign troops will then be withdrawn. And in the same fashion as the post-Soviet withdrawl in 1989, a brutal civil war will follow in Afghanistan, as the Taliban attempts to regain control of the country. It is when this process will start, however. I do not see the American government adhering to the 2014 withdrawl date, especially if the next president is Republican.
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